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Abstract. In this work, we propose a study on the use of post-quantum
cryptographic primitives for the Tor network in order to make it safe in
a quantum world. With this aim, the underlying keying material has
first been analysed. We observe that breaking the security of the algo-
rithms/protocols that use long- and medium-term keys (usually RSA
keys) have the highest impact in security. Therefore, we investigate the
cost of quantum-safe variants. These include key generation, key encap-
sulation and decapsulation. Six different post-quantum cryptographic
algorithms that ensure level 1 NIST security are evaluated. We further
target the Tor circuit creation operation and evaluate the overhead of the
post-quantum variant. This comparative study is performed through a
reference implementation based on SweetOnions that simulates Tor with
slight simplifications. We show that a quantum-safe Tor circuit creation
is possible and suggest two versions - one that can be used in a purely
quantum-safe setting, and one that can be used in a hybrid setting.
Keywords: Tor, anonymous routing, post-quantum cryptography
1 Introduction
Nowadays, information available online is expanding in an unforeseen way, a
vast amount of data is uploaded and shared through social media, IoT, etc.
[14]. However, this data also attracts unwanted attention and might paint a bad
image of some stakeholders. Consider the case of Edward Snowden who put the
National Security Agency (NSA) in the spotlight by shedding light on how the
American population was wiretapped [13]. When blowing the whistle on such
a large scale one would aim to remain anonymous, as this act can negatively
affect the career and freedom of the individual. In oppressive regimes, where the
freedom of speech is abused, this is even more serious, as any type of negative
speech, whistle-blowing or expressing freedom of information may be recognized
as an act of treason resulting in severe punishments.
The Onion Router (Tor [8]) aims to obfuscate the anonymity of its users when
accessing or communicating over the Internet. In principle, when using Tor, the
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messages or website connection requests are sent through a network of relays
and after multiple ’hops’ reach their destination. So, if Alice wants to send Bob
a message, but does not want an eavesdropper to know that she initiated the
contact, Alice can use Tor. The cryptographic schemes used today and in Tor
are based on hard mathematical assumptions e.g., Discrete Logarithm Problem
and integer factorization [12]. These schemes are assumed to be secure against
classical adversaries, as solving them with the currently known algorithms cost
exponential time. However, with a quantum computer solving these problems
become feasible.
The transition from current cryptography to post-quantum cryptography
needs to be started as soon as possible as quantum computers pose a threat to
current and in particular public-key cryptographic algowithms. It is expected
that this will have significant effects on IT infrastructure. This is due to the
heavier operations quantum-safe cryptography requires for setting up connec-
tions [11]. Furthermore, network load is also expected to increase as message
sizes are bound to get larger due to the increased encryption sizes. Tor is a vol-
unteer run network all across the globe and both the people running the nodes
and the users connecting are going to experience drawbacks.
Contributions In this work, we investigate the main challenges to build and
maintain a quantum-safe Tor network. We first examine the different keying
material used in Tor and identify the impact of the compromise of each of them.
We observe that the migration towards quantum-safe Tor should start with the
update of cryptographic algorithms that involve long-term and medium-term
keys such as the identity key. Such a migration naturally results in additional
cost in terms of CPU and bandwidth.
In order to evaluate the actual overhead resulting from the shift to post-
quantum cryptographic algorithms, we have conducted an experimental study
while considering six different post-quantum public-key encryption algorithms
that are part of NIST’s round 2 submissions3. The implementation of these al-
gorithms is provided by the Open Quantum Safe library [18]. We particularly
analyze the cost of key generation, key encapsulation and key decapsulation, and
compare them with the currently used algorithms deriving from the RSA cryp-
tosystem or elliptic curve cryptography. We observe that each implementation
comes with different advantages and limitations, and that consequently there is
no ideal solution that offers optimal CPU and bandwidth overhead.
We further focus on a Tor network operation, namely circuit building, and
compare the cost of the post-quantum variant operation with the original one.
This comparative study is performed through a reference implementation based
on SweetOnions4 that simulates Tor with slight modifications. Additionally, sim-
ilar to [11,9], a hybrid implementation combining the use of post-quantum cryp-
tography with classical schemes is also proposed. Such an implementation pro-
3 https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-2-submissions
4 https://github.com/LeonHeTheFirst/SweetOnions, accessed on 28/11/2019,
11:21am
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tects against potential security flaws of quantum-safe schemes due to their recent
publications. We show that while the increase in CPU time is acceptable and
similar among different implementations, the bandwidth overhead remains sig-
nificant and the optimal performance is achieved when Sike [10] is used.
2 Background
2.1 The Onion Router (Tor)
The onion routing network, Tor [8], is one of the most popular tools to achieve
anonymity for web browsing. When a Tor user accesses a website on the Internet,
the traffic encrypted with multiple encryption layers is routed across multiple
relays. The use of multiple nodes enroute to the destination helps obfuscate the
connection of users and hence achieve anonymity: Each node in the path towards
the destination (named a circuit), only has information about the previous node
and the next node in the path. Messages are encrypted by the source in a layered
fashion whereby each encryption layer is removed by one relay node. Nowadays,
Tor counts around 6 000 nodes5 and the default number of relay nodes to set
up a circuit is three (entry node, middle node, exit node)6. Each node has to
communicate information called descriptors towards Directory Authorities, who
maintain a state of the network. The Directory Authorities vote on the status
of the network to obtain a consensus document. The user connects to one of the
Directory Authorities, fetches the consensus document and the Tor software will
select a path from the available nodes. The overall Tor framework is illustrated
in Figure 1. The security and privacy features that Tor ensures rely on the
use of essential cryptographic primitives such as encryption, digital signatures
and key exchange. Consequently, each Tor node receives and maintains multiple
cryptographic keys for different purposes. Table 1 provides an overview of the
asymmetric keys used in Tor with their lifetime and functionalities. Long-term
keys are used at least for one year, medium-term keys are used for three to twelve
months, and short-term keys have a lifespan of minutes to a maximum of one
day.
2.2 Post-quantum cryptography
The security of the current asymmetric encryption and digital signature stan-
dards mostly depend on the hardness of integer factorization (RSA) or discrete
logarithm (Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm) [12]. As described
in [16], such cryptographic schemes can be easily broken in polynomial time
when using quantum computers. Hence, researchers are actively developing post-
quantum cryptographic solutions to resist quantum attacks [4].
5 https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html, accessed on 28/11/2019, 4:33pm
6 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide, accessed on
28/11/2019, 4:33pm
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Fig. 1. An overview of Tor containing nine directory authorities (DAs), a bridge au-
thority, the consensus document, Tor nodes, the symmetric keys (sk), and the message
(msg).
In 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) opened
a call for proposals on the topic of quantum-safe cryptographic solutions for
new quantum-safe standards [15]. The first round contained 69 submissions. On
January 30, 2019 the candidates for the second round were announced, consisting
of 17 asymmetric key encryption and key-establishment algorithms and 9 digital
signature algorithms.
The transition to quantum-safe cryptographic schemes is expected to be a
lengthy process. The adoption of quantum-safe schemes results in a significant
increase in bandwidth and computational cost. Developers adopt the hybrid
approach whereby currently used standardized cryptographic schemes are com-
bined with quantum-safe schemes.
2.3 Related work
At the time of writing, there are two papers that consider a quantum-safe Tor
network, namely [9] and [11]. Both solutions mainly focus on the problem of
key exchange. In [9], the proposed solution named HybridOR is a customized key
exchange protocol. The solution is reported to be computationally more efficient
compared to currently used the ntor protocol. HybridOR is assumed to be secure
under the ring-Learning With Error (r-LWE) assumption. In [11], the focus is
also on securely establishing the short-term keys in a quantum-safe fashion. The
currently used ntor protocol is modified and is called Hybrid. Hybrid uses a
combination of long-term keys generated by Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and
short-term keys generated by a quantum-safe scheme NTRUEncrypt. We observe
that existing solutions focus on the problem of key exchange only. Furthermore,
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Type Key lifetime Key name Function
RSA
long-term identity key Establish relay identity, sign documents
and certificates. Since the introduction of
Ed25519, RSA is only used to establish relay
identity.
medium-term onion key Decrypt cells at circuit creation. Used in
ntor and TAP for handshakes.
short-term connection key Establish TLS channels between nodes.
Curve25519 medium-term handshake key Handle handshakes in the ntor protocol.
Ed25519
long-term master identity key Sign medium-term Ed25519 key. This key
never changes.
medium-term signing key Replaces RSA identity key to sign docu-
ments and certificates.
short-term link authentication key Authenticate handshakes after a Tor circuit
negotiation.
Table 1. Function of RSA, Curve25519 and Ed25519 keys in Tor.
their performance study only focuses on the use of one particular quantum-safe
cryptographic scheme. For example, Hybrid is evaluated using the NTRUEncrypt
algorithm only. Therefore there seems to be a lack of comparative study among
different quantum-safe cryptographic primitives.
3 Migration towards quantum-safe Tor
In a quantum world, the users of Tor need to have the same security and
anonymity guarantees as they currently have in a classical setting. A quantum-
safe Tor network should provide users security and anonymity against quantum
adversaries whilst preserving the security and anonymity claims against classi-
cal adversaries. Current attack scenarios on Tor do not target the cryptography
used in Tor, but aim to exploit other potential weaknesses. However, power-
ful enough quantum computers will pose a new threat to Tor as cryptography
becomes vulnerable for abuse by quantum adversaries.
3.1 Challenges
With quantum computing emerging, the cryptography of Tor needs to be changed,
as the quantum vulnerability of asymmetric key cryptography will open a new
attack surface for quantum adversaries. Introducing post-quantum cryptography
to Tor must be done in order to keep cryptographic vulnerabilities off the list
of attack surfaces. It is pivotal to introduce quantum-safe cryptography to the
keys of the nodes. Table 2 explains the attacker capabilities in case the RSA,
Curve25519 or Ed25519 schemes are broken, thereby compromising the keys of
the nodes.
Current attack scenarios Current attacks on Tor do not target the cryptogra-
phy, but rather focus on vulnerabilities in Tor related software, hidden services,
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Key Attacker capability
Identity key (long-term) Impersonate a node, send spoofed descriptors that are
signed by the compromised identity key.
Onion key (medium-term) Read content of Tor cells until the next key rotation.
Connection key (short-term) See encrypted traffic between nodes.
Handshake key (medium-term) Read content of Tor cells when a circuit is created.
Master identity key (long-term) Create a new signing key.
Signing key (medium-term) Sign modified documents and publish them to the di-
rectory servers.
Link authentication key (short-term) Authenticate connections that should be not allowed.
Table 2. Attacker capabilities with compromised asymmetric schemes.
bridge node discovery, disabling the network, and on generic attacks like timing.
A common technique of adversaries is to introduce new nodes to the Tor net-
work, but this is a lengthy process due to the policy of the network. New nodes
are even more closely monitored than nodes already in the network for malicious
patterns and if such is recognized, they are excluded from the network.
Cryptographic attacks In this section, we consider, attack scenarios on the
keys of the nodes that a quantum adversary possesses.
There are four types of keys in Tor (See Table 1) and all of these can be
compromised by an attacker:
– short-term key. Compromising a short-term key at an entry node would make
an adversary capable to follow the entire circuit from sender to recipient. This
would lead to deanonymization of the user. After ending a TLS connection,
the keys are renewed. Therefore, an attack on a short-term key is performed
during the lifetime of its TLS connection.
– medium-term key. In case an adversary compromises the short-term key and
the medium-term key of a node, the attacker can impersonate this node.
Since a node can decrypt one layer of symmetric encryption when the mes-
sages are passed through it, the previous and next ‘hop’ in the circuit are
learned by the adversary. The attack has to be performed before the rotation
of the medium-term and short-term keys.
– long-term key. The long-term key may also be compromised by an adversary.
This would enable the adversary to impersonate the node and send forged
descriptors to the directory nodes. Furthermore, it allows the adversary to
gain indefinite, full access to the node. Moreover, the adversary sees previous
and consecutive ‘hops’ in the circuit with the encrypted cells.
– symmetric key. Symmetric keys are used to encrypt the data sent between
nodes. In the current implementation of Tor, AES 128-bit is used for the
symmetric encryption [7]. The key size of this scheme should be doubled in
order to remain safe against quantum adversaries. The AES 256-bit scheme
is claimed to achieve 128-bit security against quantum adversaries [4].
Compromising the symmetric keys enables an adversary to decrypt layers of
encryption and learn the destination of the message; anonymity is at risk. In
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case the attacker learns nothing but the symmetric keys, the encrypted message
must be intercepted before entering the network as the TLS connection will add
an extra layer of security. If an adversary does not learn all the symmetric keys,
but only a subset, then it cannot fully decrypt the message and thus, the circuit
is not fully known, so source and destination remain anonymous.
Current attacks on Tor are carried out with colluding adversaries. If adver-
saries control the entry and exit nodes in the network, they can share information
with each other and as a result deanonymize communicating parties. Colluding
adversaries at the entry and at the exit node who have the medium-term keys
will both know the middle relay in a circuit. Sharing this knowledge enables
them to attempt to deanonymize users, as the users using the common middle
node have the greatest probability to be communicating with each other.
3.2 Migration strategy for quantum-safe Tor
Considering Table 2 and the lifetime of the asymmetric keys, it is most urgent
to update the long-term keys to a quantum-safe alternative. Long-term keys
remain unchanged for a long time-period. Hence, an adversary has more time
to compromise long-term keys. The effects of compromising long-term keys are
also greater, as an adversary can thereby impersonate a node. The second most
urgent, is updating the medium-term keys based on the available time period
for compromising is smaller. Finally, the short-term keys must be considered,
even though the attacker has limited time to compromise these keys due to the
security restrictions of Tor. Furthermore, short-term keys are used with TLS,
and there are works on making TLS quantum-safe [5]. We do stress that it is
crucial to update every asymmetric scheme to a quantum-safe alternative in
order to enforce the security and anonymity claims of Tor.
Lastly, we note that the symmetric keys must be updated to AES 256 bits to
prevent ‘store now, decrypt later’-attacks and ensure that users of Tor maintain
life-long anonymity.
4 Impact of post-quantum cryptography on Tor
In this section, we investigate the impact that post-quantum cryptography might
have on the Tor network, when following the suggested migration strategy in
Section 3.2. The impact of migrating all asymmetric cryptography to a quantum-
safe alternative has an impact on the performance (both computational and
network) and reliability of Tor. We focus, in particular, on the key exchanges as
updating these has the greatest effect on the overall performance and reliability
of Tor.
4.1 Benchmarking post-quantum cryptography
We benchmark the post-quantum cryptography schemes that have been imple-
mented in the Open Quantum Safe library [18].
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Open Quantum Safe library The Open Quantum Safe library contains mul-
tiple implementations of post-quantum secure key encapsulation and signature
schemes. The schemes reach NIST security levels 1 to 5, however we only tested
the schemes that achieve level 1 NIST security. The tested schemes are listed in
Table 3.
System setup For the experiment, local and virtual environments are both
used. The technical specification of the notebook used for the local experiments
is Dell Latitude E7240, with Intel Core i5-4310U CPU @ 2.00 - 2.60GHz pro-
cessor, 8 GB RAM, Samsung SSD SM841N mSATA 128 GB for storage and
Windows 10 Enterprise 64-bit operating system. Furthermore, an Ubuntu 18.04
LTS subsystem was installed. In order to emulate the Tor network, 6 virtual ma-
chines were used with Intel Core Processor (Broadwell) @ 2.4 GHz processors,
60 GB storage, a virtual network adapter, and Linux version 4.15.0 operating
system.
Methods and results We performed measurements and obtained benchmarks
for the following properties of the encryption schemes:
1. Public key, private key and ciphertext sizes,
2. CPU cycles for RSA key generation,
3. CPU cycles for quantum-safe key generation,
4. CPU cycles for RSA encryption and decryption,
5. CPU cycles for quantum-safe encapsulation and decapsulation.
To get an average result for the CPU cycle measurements, 1 000 iterations were
run with each test, the number of CPU cycles corresponding to one second is
2 399 753 472 cycles. Table 3 contains the public key, private key and ciphertext
sizes. Table 4 contains the number of CPU cycles needed for encapsulation and
decapsulation of a message and CPU cycles required for key generation, Figure 2
illustrates this in time (ms) for all the schemes tested.
Scheme Public key size Private key size Ciphertext size
(bytes) (bytes) (bytes)
RSA-1024 < 128 < 128 128
RSA-2048 < 256 < 256 256
Frodo-640-AES [2] 9 616 19 888 9 720
Frodo-640-SHAKE [2] 9 616 19 888 9 720
Kyber512 [3] 800 1 632 736
NewHope-512-CCA [1] 928 1 888 1 120
NTRU-HPS-2048-509 [6] 699 935 699
Sike-p503 [10] 378 434 402
Table 3. The key sizes for RSA and quantum-safe schemes.
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Key lengths have an effect on network load as they are sent to the Direc-
tory Authorities, and the Directory Authorities distribute them to the clients.
Larger ciphertexts have a significant detrimental effect on the stability, reli-
ability and performance of a network as an increase in ciphertext size has a
direct consequence on network load. We observe that, both Frodo-640-AES and
Frodo-640-SHAKE have a problematic ciphertext size of 9 720 bytes.
From Table 4, we observe that the lattice-based quantum-safe schemes (Kyber,
NewHope, NTRU) require less CPU cycles for generating keys than RSA-1024.
Kyber and NewHope drastically outperform the other schemes. We also note that
the supersingular isogeny-based quantum-safe scheme Sike, even though slightly
less performant than RSA-1024, outperforms RSA-2048.
Key generation only affects the nodes as they generate keys based on the
generation time defined in Tor. The factor that affects both the nodes and the
client is the time/computation needed to encapsulate and decapsulate messages.
Benchmark encapsulation and decapsulation measurements are presented in Ta-
ble 4. Opposed to key generation times, where all lattice-based schemes outper-
formed RSA-1024, we observe that NTRU requires more CPU cycles for encap-
sulation. However, decapsulation for lattice-based implementations require less
CPU cycles than RSA-1024. Sike requires the most CPU cycles for encapsula-
tions and decapsulations, as it is almost 48 times more computationally heavy
than RSA-2048.
Scheme Encapsulation Decapsulation Key generation
RSA-1024 410 402 2 078 161 61 568 194
RSA-2048 730 570 5 718 858 266 140 623
Kyber512 170 856 195 106 152 973
NewHope-512-CCA 228 687 247 457 193 367
NTRU-HPS-2048-509 636 263 1 609 748 27 632 969
Sike-p503 149 691 623 159 119 760 90 800 645
Table 4. CPU cycles for encapsulation, decapsulation and key generation averaged
over 1 000 test runs.
Lattice-based schemes (Kyber, NewHope, NTRU) have better performance for
CPU cycles than the RSA schemes. This suggests that these are the most fit
candidates for replacing classical cryptographic schemes. However, based on ci-
phertext sizes, Sike is the best fit as the ciphertext size fits within one Tor cell
(512 bytes).
4.2 Impact
A migration of classical cryptography to quantum-safe cryptography can have a
big effect on the overall availability, reliability, stability and performance of Tor.
An important factor to take into account is network load. An increase in the
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Fig. 2. CPU cycles of Table 4 converted to time.
number of packets needed to transfer the ciphertexts of the schemes has a large
effect on the network performance.
The factor computation time, on the other end, influences the response time
to users as an increase in computation time directly influences response time.
The impact of computation time will be felt in the performance of Tor.
We note that a trade-off has to be made between network load and compu-
tation time, when considering the schemes that we tested.
5 Case study: Circuit creation in Tor
To investigate the impact of post-quantum cryptography on Tor, we propose to
investigate the performance of one particular protocol, namely circuit creation.
Our framework uses the SweetOnions implementation7 which is a simplified ver-
sion of the circuit creation protocol used in Tor. We consider two quantum-safe
versions of this protocol: a version in which we only use post-quantum cryptog-
raphy (QSO), and a hybrid version of the protocol (HSO) in which we combine
the currently used cryptography with post-quantum cryptography. The reference
implementation (SO) that uses standard cryptographic schemes, namely RSA, is
also evaluated. We now provide a detailed description of each protocol.
7 https://github.com/LeonHeTheFirst/SweetOnions, accessed on 28/11/2019,
11:21am
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5.1 Protocol descriptions
Protocol 1: Sweet Onion (SO)
Client (m) Node (pkN )
KAES ←R {0, 1}256
c← EncAES(KAES ,m)
c′ ← EncRSA(pkN ,KAES)
(c,c′)−−−−−→
KAES ← DecRSA(skN , c′)
m← DecAES(KAES , c)
Sweet Onion (SO) protocol In the original SweetOnions protocol, defined
in Protocol 1 for one layer, the client who aims to send a message m to node
N , N ∈ N, encapsulates the symmetric data encryption key using N ’s public
RSA key pkN . To set up a circuit the client has to perform these steps with all
the nodes in the circuit. Once the client knows the address of every node, this
is done in sequence, each node between the client and destination decrypts one
layer of encryption and forwards the message.
Protocol 2: Quantum-safe Sweet Onion (QSO)
Client (m) Node (pkPQN )
KAES ←R {0, 1}256
c← EncAES(KAES ,m)
c′ ← EncPQC(pkPQN ,KAES)
(c,c′)−−−−−→
KAES ← DecPQC(skPQN , c′)
m← DecAES(KAES , c)
Quantum-safe Sweet Onion (QSO) The QSO corresponds to the simple
quantum-safe variant of SO: the RSA key encapsulation method (KEM) is ex-
changed with a post-quantum KEM (PQC), see Protocol 2. The public-private
key pair of the node consists of post-quantum keys.
Hybrid Sweet Onion (HSO) In the hybrid SweetOnions (HSO) protocol, the
RSA KEM is combined with a post-quantum KEM. Hence, the client randomly
generates two symmetric encryption keys. The first key is encapsulated with
the standard RSA encryption algorithm and the second key is encapsulated with
12 Z. Tujner, T.A. Rooijakkers, M. van Heesch, M. O¨nen
Protocol 3: Hybrid Sweet Onion (HSO)
Client (m) Node (pkN , pk
PQ
N )
K1AES ,K
2
AES ←R {0, 1}256
KAES = K
1
AES ⊕K2AES
c← EncAES(KAES ,m)
c′ ← EncRSA(pkN ,K1AES)
c′′ ← EncPQC(pkPQN ,K2AES)
(c,c,c′′)−−−−−−→
K1AES ← DecRSA(skN , c′)
K2AES ← DecPQC(skPQN , c′′)
KAES = K
1
AES ⊕K2AES
m← DecAES(KAES , c)
a post-quantum encryption algorithm. The actual data encryption key is the
result of a simple XOR of these two symmetric keys. Hence the receiver should
perform two decapsulation operations (one with RSA and one with post-quantum
decryption).
5.2 Experimental results of quantum-safe circuit builds
In this section, we evaluate the performance of each protocol in terms of CPU
and bandwidth consumption. The size of one Tor packet is 512 bytes. For the
reference SO protocol, the underlying encryption algorithms are RSA-2048 and
AES-192. For the two other protocols, the post-quantum cryptographic schemes
studied in Section 4.1 are used.
Experimental results on CPU consumption and bandwidth overhead are
given in Table 5. In particular, we evaluate the cost of wrapping the layers
of encryption, decapsulating one layer of encryption, and the overall circuit cre-
ation. The table also includes the size of one message and the number of packets
needed for this protocol.
Quantum-safe Sweet Onion (QSO) experimental results We observe that
QSO based on all lattice-based post-quantum schemes outperforms the original
SO. On the other hand, while the integration of Sike increases the overall time
significantly, the bandwidth overhead is very close to SO.
To summarize, a lattice-based scheme may be considered as a potential
cryptographic primitive for circuit building since these schemes require less
CPU cycles compared to Sike. Nevertheless, the use of lattice-based schemes
significantly increases the number of packets and network load compared to
Sike. Therefore, depending on the original communication cost, one can decide
whether to choose Sike or a lattice-based PQC.
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Scheme Wrap encryp- Remove Total circuit Message Packets Time
tion layers one layer build size (bytes) needed needed
Original 5 131 765 13 714 147 46 274 206 1 223 3 0.0193s
Kyber 1 371 999 917 080 4 123 240 3 248 7 0.0017s
NewHope 1 618 934 1 119 668 4 977 938 4 832 10 0.0021s
NTRU 2 803 358 4 149 134 15 250 759 3 099 7 0.0064s
Sike 452 691 951 271 667 313 1 267 693 889 1 874 4 0.5283s
Hybrid Kyber 6 188 037 15 734 659 53 392 015 5 774 12 0.0222s
Hybrid NewHope 6 953 196 13 771 785 48 268 550 7 886 16 0.0201s
Hybrid NTRU 7 517 316 18 977 229 64 449 002 5 550 11 0.0269s
Hybrid Sike 456 441 243 275 867 016 1 284 042 291 3 938 8 0.5351s
Table 5. The CPU cycles needed for building a circuit (averaged over 1 000 test runs)
and message sizes.
Hybrid Sweet Onion (HSO) experimental results When using the hy-
brid scheme, we observe that both the computational cost and the bandwidth
increases significantly. This is mainly due to the fact that HSO uses one RSA
encapsulation and one encapsulation with PQC. Consequently, the cost orig-
inating from PQC for lattice-based cryptographic schemes becomes negligible
when combined with RSA. Even though CPU consumption remains affordable in
the hybrid implementation, the bandwidth overhead is important. The number
of packets is at least doubled when switching to the hybrid solutions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the main challenges to develop a quantum-safe
Tor network and focused on the algorithms that use long-term and medium-term
keys. Experimental studies show that among the six post-quantum cryptographic
scheme evaluated, there is no single winning solution. Nevertheless, given the
current status of the NIST standardisation process, Sike seems the most optimal
one when it comes to assessing the communication overhead.
As for future work, it may be interesting to test other schemes such as the
code-based BIKE. Testing the remaining lattice and isogeny-based schemes is also
an interesting future topic as they might have better performance measurements
than the ones currently available in the Open Quantum Safe library. As for
field experiments, an implementation of Tor called TorLAB [17] is available and
simulates Tor on a private network of Raspberry PIs. It would be beneficial to re-
create the network and extend the measurements of our research to the network
load. This would ensure a more realistic study for the evaluation of expected
circuit build times, since in the current setting, network latency is omitted.
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